In 
Introduction
A stream of thought, especially in the Scandinavian countries, argues that change is not an exception, but rather a prerequisite for stability (Brunsson, 1989; Brunsson and Olsen, 1993; Czarniawska and Sevón, 1996) . Change efforts are according to this view legitimizing actions to ensure stability. Changes occur on a regular basis and identity transformations and modifications in society are expressions of such a change (Meyer, 1996; Sahlin-Andersson, 1996; Spybey, 1996) . It could therefore be argued that organizational change, in practice as well as in theory, is the norm rather than the exception.
If change is the norm, organizing processes express struggles of competing worldviews, discourses and actions. Neither organizations nor technologies are static, but must be seen as actors involved in the organizing efforts. A focus on organizations or technologies as static entities neglects the intricacies of such struggles. Organizations contain a swarm of change efforts but organizing implies a mobilization of the efforts in order to obtain configuration. It is therefore our attempt to focus on networks of actions in order to come closer to the construction of political technologies and technological politics.
To understand political technologies and technological politics it is necessary to refrain from predefined constructs such as intentions, society, and culture. Technologies are no stable artefacts that travel through society and live lives of their own but are constantly shaped and reshaped. Technologies are never stabilized once and for all, can never take a rest, but need to fight for their everyday survival. All technologies are temporary, fragile and must on a daily basis find proponents and supporters, allies to use Latour's (1996/93) terminology. The existence of a particular technology is an empirical question and can thereby only be determined at a particular time window in space.
Technology and society are intermingled, i.e. society constructs technology and technology constructs society (Latour, 1991; Law and Callon, 1992) . Thus, if new technology emerges, it seems reasonable that such technology might lead to organizational change. In the case of information technology, this is certainly the case, although the extent of change is an empirical question.
It is therefore our approach to study projects in which technological efforts gain or lose degrees of reality when many different organizing efforts are undertaken by actants of disparate origins.
'Clusters', 'networks', 'virtual' organizations and 'temporary' projects are just a few labels of emerging organizational forms, enabled in particularly by the new emerging information technology, which mirror how the interest is turning from internal issues concerning size or technology to "the newly found fluidity in the external appearance of organizations" (Clegg and Hardy, 1996) . This turn of interest raises the question of how techno-economic networks emerge and survive. Since a technology can be treated as an action program coordinating a network of roles (Akrich and Latour, 1992) , a technological network might appear like a mess of roles and technologies colliding in society. In this paper we show how technologies of information networks become temporarily stabilized in a world of permanent organizational change.
We have deliberately chosen two technological networks to illustrate the point that even technological networks, as stable as they may seem, can only survive as stabilized entities as long as they constantly attract the unbroken love, affection and commitment of others.
The first network, Teleguide, was a Swedish IT venture in the early 1990s that, after great expectations and high political interest, rapidly disappeared from the public scene and died. The other network, broadband infrastructure for fast Internet access, has the latest five years become the prime political symbol for Sweden as a modern and high-tech nation. We try to illustrate that information technologies are never a-political and that politics is increasingly infused with technological content.
Methodology
The empirical material stems from one seemingly failed and one seemingly successful IT venture. Both IT networks over time drew on thought figures such as democracy, freedom of speech and political disclosure. They became explicitly political in expansion as well as in deterioration phases.
An introductory mapping of all press clippings in Sweden between 1985 and 1995 covering "Teleguide" was undertaken. A media mapping of how the term "IT" made its way into the public was made through studying all issues of Sweden's municipal weekly between 1990 and 1997. Interviews with 25 central IT-network actors and Teleguide users was carried out during [1997] [1998] [1999] , and members of the IT-council in Stockholm were interviewed on issues of the construction of IT-networks. In addition, 9 panel debates have been attended, recorded and transcribed, and numerous Internet sites have been downloaded.
From this sprawling data we form a narrative based on chronological descriptions of the developments of the two networks. As our intention is to study action nets instead of organizations we have focused on the narratives of events. This has enabled us to reconstruct developments of the events, i.e. narratives. We follow Donald Polkinghorne's notions of narrative presentation in that our reception (interpretation and understanding) of the stories is transformed into a presentation of the development (Polkinghorne, 1987) . Thus, the developments presented here are just one possible story. The point with our story is not to give a better or more reasonable account, but an alternative one which makes it possible to compare it with other stories that flourish in the field (Czarniawska, 1997 ).
Our perspective is that change is the norm in organizing efforts. To understand organizing it is therefore necessary to re-contextualize events and to recognize time as an important actor. Organizing, when viewed as a snapshot, is static, but emerging technologies must be seen in chronological context and as narrative reconstructions (Czarniawska, 1998; Czarniawska, 1999) .
Theoretical framework -unstable technologies
A technology exist only as long as spokespersons can perform relevant translations by which networks of socio-technical "actants" are assembled as a whole (Latour, 1996) . In this view, technology is seen as an emerging network in which coalitions of humans and non-humans, individuals and groups, come together in an ongoing chain of translations.
Thus, descriptions of technological trajectories are not linear models of how ideas are implemented through plans and diffuse throughout society, but are the effects of heterogeneous interests, emotions and consensus, as well as carelessness, conflict and clashing intentions. So the nature of a technology changes whenever a new actor becomes allied to the technology or whenever another member leaves the coalition. It changes for every agreement or disagreement. To be precise, the ontology of a technology is the effect of ongoing negotiations where the technology never is real, but is gaining or loosing in degrees of reality. To Latour, links between actors, however fragile and subtle, determine technology, just as links between different technologies determine socio-technical networks of another magnitude (Latour, 1996) . This is why we focus on a net of actions, or the action net (Czarniawska, 1998) , that is needed for a technology to survive. Thereby, an action net does not have any analytic qualities, but it helps us to minimize taken-for-grantedness before the analysis starts. An action net gives preference to relations that we regard are more interesting than that what is related, since it is in the relation, through actions, that a temporary stability can be reached.
Technologies, artifacts, texts, images and are all acting parts in networks that consist of human as well as non-human 'actants' (Latour, 1987; Callon, 1991) . Thereby, it becomes necessary to shift focus away from humans only. The networks build their strengths by recruiting allies, that is other actants, in order to construct stability. Over time a network can obtain sufficient amounts of support from allies in order for it to be temporarily stable. An actor that manages to turn the relevant actants into allies may settle the ongoing power struggle and temporarily stabilize it (Callon, 1986) .
Technologies may lose relevant allies and thereby fade away to be forgotten. But they always leave traces that may be picked up at other times and in other places, and perhaps recruit stronger allies in order to again begin a journey through increasing degrees of reality. The technologies we see are not the ones that passed all the tests, filters and gateways, not the ones that reached technological, commercial and market success.
Instead, it is the ones that live at the moment, the ones that managed to recruit and mobilize actants that construct the technology, that speak on behalf of it and represent it.
"A technology arrives, first as a nebulous idea, something only vaguely, in some minds, related to some actions, which then lands heavily on the ground, showing its nasty side, requiring still new investments and additional commitments." (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996:19) Why then, do some technologies die and others live? To scholars of innovation, the answer lies in actors failure or success to attend to a process of innovation including recognition of technical feasibility, potential demand, idea formulation, problem solving, solution through invention, development, and finally implementation and use (Marquis, 1969 ). Yet, such explanations of change or inertia are rooted in a separation between technology and society. But when technology and society are seen as intermingled, and technologies are seen as actants in networks of other actants, an alternative understanding of organizational stability and change can arise. In the following, we will describe the development of two communication technologies that appeared on the public arena during the 1990's. One that failed to recruit enough allies to survive, and another that has managed not only to survive, but also to recruit such a strong network of other actants that it is presently one of the most dominating actants that exist.
The rise and fall of a network. The Swedish Teleguide project "It was completely useless, it was not good for anything. It was expensive and bulky and it felt a little bit silly to keep it after it became clear that the project had collapsed" (Ex-user) "The ticket-ordering system never worked. Nobody understood how it was supposed to work. Besides, the Teleguide terminals were so big and ugly it is no surprise that the project was abandoned. It would have been completely different if the terminals were small and elegant like the ones in France." (Ex-user) substitute for a telephone book and two years later there were million terminals in operation. The investment led to that 15 million Frenchmen used Minitel in 1998. Approximately 25 000 services are available, almost all of them cost money when used, and the most common ones are classified ads, mail-orders, and different kinds of transportation orders. In 1998 Minitel generated around 6.5 billion FF in revenue to France Telecom, and the service providers received approximately the same amount.
That Minitel became a success on the user side was according to France Telecom's own customer satisfaction reports, that the terminals were small, simple and cheap, that no fixed subscription or investment in hardware was needed; customers pay only for the time they used the services.
That Minitel became such a large success depended, according to Castells (1996) , partly on the interest from the French government, and partly on that the system was user friendly and with an easy payment system and extensive accessibility. The French government supported the project for 12 years, and it became profitable first at the end of 1995. The project was edged by political, structural decisions and was organized according to a very clear model. It was imprinted by a will to construct a well organized, homogeneous system that the government, through France Telecom, could keep control over. It was a gigantic infrastructural investment, and France's reputation as a "hightech" nation grew at the same time as the number of high-speed (TGV) trains increased throughout the country. Minitel was an effort to boost the diminishing electronics industry in France (Castells, 1996) . France Telecom opened up the Minitel to all interested parties, and no license was needed to provide services over Minitel. The grand interest appeared when the so-called 'messageries' entered the Minitel system. They were communication channels for private persons, and many of these channels specialized on sex and sexual services. By 1990 more than half of the Minitel traffic was sex related.
But the system did not only turn out to be a tool for electronized sex-trade, but also, according to Castells (1996) , a space where individuals could live out their sexual fantasies and dreams, i.e. a democratized sexual fantasy. Castells strongly puts forward the idea that it was the sexual allurement that made Minitel take off at the end of the 1980's. As the usage rate increased the sex-rate percentage of total traffic diminished.
But, according to Castells, it was the detour through individual actor's personal fantasies that enabled the future expansion. Teleguide to be a strategic product that could give them a position in electronic services.
Birth of the Teleguide project
The terminals were to be connected to the telephone socket and the subscriber could order tickets, mail order products, and do bank errands. The objective was to connect one million Swedes to the network.
The Teleguide was a screen and a keyboard in one piece. On top of the screen rested a telephone in order for the terminal to be used as an ordinary telephone as well. The consultancy companies described the Teleguide as a system that made it possible for companies to reach new customers. Yet the technology was not risk-free. It jeopardized the role of intermediaries, wrote a large consultancy in their competitive analysis of the Teleguide. If customers could buy travel services and transport, travel and transport agencies would become obsolete.
Nine months after TT broke the news the ambitions had changed substantially. The budget was reduced by 75%, and the goal was according to the project manager at Esselte, to distribute 500 000 terminals within five years. The terminals should still be free, but a subscription rate of 7 USD was added. Thereafter, the use of services would cost around 1.25 USD per minute. Smart cards were to be used, in order for each subscriber to use any Teleguide terminal. The smart card also enabled the system to identify the subscriber, something that the Minitel was not able to do. Since Televerket had earlier invested in networks, Teleguide seemed to be an excellent occasion to generate revenue in order to match the large investments.
In the Swedish press during 1990, the visions were blown up with constant references to Minitel. In five years the 500 000 Swedes would pay one billion USD for different services and the average subscriber would use Teleguide 100 minutes per month. The project would turn profitable in 1994, and the terminal forecasts now estimated 2 million terminals in total. The subscribers could book taxi, follow the stock market and gamble on the horse races. Teleguide, however, demanded from the suppliers that they should deliver attractive services to the subscribers. The key success factor, according to Teleguide project management, was that the services should be attractive enough. In November 1990, the first terminal prototypes were delivered. The 50 000 terminals were to be distributed in 1991. Late 1990, the forecasts had once more been re-calculated and increased. The Teleguide was now referred to as the biggest media project ever in Swedish history.
Approximately one year later, in October 1991, Teleguide was launched. The most popular services were estimated to be the Swedish national telephone directory, the bank service and the travel services. A test was conducted with some hundred households in the three largest urban areas in Sweden. To be among the 100 test households was attractive: 13 000 volunteered. The subscription rate had now increased to 10 USD per month and the services were to be as expensive as 1,75 USD per minute. No particular target group was identified since the Teleguide project management considered the terminals to be part of each citizen's everyday practice. A blue-as well as white-collar household was included in the target group. That Teleguide was a product geared for the general public was recognized in the use of the term "household". Representatives from the Teleguide project group never used the term "individual". Rather, the term "household", with its roots in the Swedish people's home tradition, signalled the mass distribution that the project aimed at.
During the late summer of 1991 the consultancy Coopers & Lybrand published a report on Minitel's profitability. The report revealed that the French project had not been as profitable as was earlier thought. According to the report, Minitel would not show profitability until 1998; a great impairment as compared to the earlier forecasts. The Teleguide management, who had earlier used Minitel vastly as comparison, dismissed the similarities between Teleguide and Minitel. At this point it was the technological differences that were drawn upon. Minitel had to construct an entirely new network, while Teleguide had the already existing Videotex net to build on. Teleguide, according to the CEO, also had Minitel to learn from. Teleguide could use "first-follower advantages" and avoid all the traps that Minitel had gone into. Hence, it was possible to take out all the goodies from the Minitel-cake. For instance, the CEO suggested, Minitel had not made it possible to supply products that were not available anywhere else.
Teleguide would be different. It would in Teleguide be possible to be much more specific in a search function. Thereby, Teleguide would make it possible to find products and services that were impossible to get as easy through any other medium.
At this time the pressure on Teleguide increased. To show profitability after three years only demanded 250 000 subscribers to be connected around 1 hour each month. The Swedish business weekly Veckans Affärer sarcastically wrote that it was a hard task to motivate the households if they had to pay 25 USD per month just to use the telephone directory and use mail-order services that they could just as well use a printed catalogue for. Sweden was at the time amidst a recession, and most companies were under great pressure for profitability. Esselte appointed a new managing director, and his task was to decrease costs, focus on core competencies and increase profitability. Teleguide was a great cost for Esselte, and when the three-year profitability forecast was considered to be too optimistic, Teleguide started to be seen as a black hole in the treasure chest. If the new managing director was to meet the business community´s expectations to within two years make Esselte vastly more profitable, it was considered to be an impossible mission with Teleguide in the nest.
Nevertheless, a national marketing campaign was initiated. One of Sweden's hip advertising agencies was contracted, and full-size advertising was seen in all the influential Swedish dailys. Teleguide had great expectations, and in February 1992 some 50 000 terminals and 24 000 PC converters were ordered from Loewe and IBM. The order was not considered to be satisfactory, as 6500 subscribers already were connected, and the number of connected households was expected to reach 100 000 before the end of the year.
In March 1992 the board of Televerket decided to stop the costly Videotex net. The total number of subscribers was at the time, 10 years after the introduction, around 30 000, and the expected figure had been 100 000. Teleguide was thought to be a project that had the possibility of saving Videotex, but as it turned out, Teleguide could just as well use the existing telephone net.
Meanwhile, in Germany, a similar project called Videotel was underway. It was in many ways a mirror image of Teleguide, and in May a quote from Erik Danke of Videotel could be read in the Swedish press: "We have been in contact with the Swedes for a long time and we are now studying how their system is constructed. Of course we are looking into the technical details, but also we are looking into the marketing." A statement that echoed the Teleguide relationship to Minitel. Videotel and Teleguide initiated a collaboration where mainly the small businesses among the 15 000 subscribers could access a limited number of German data-bases. The plans to connect Teleguide to more countries and substantially increase the number of services now became a highly prioritized concern.
Some clouds at the sky of Teleguide During Summer 1992 the number of subscribers increased to 22 000 a number that was considered to be far too low. On September 25, approximately 6 months after the ordered 74 000 terminals and plug-ins were considered way too few, one of the Swedish dailies wrote: "The Teleguide became a flop". The article stated that the subscribers had not used the Teleguide sufficiently. As long as useable services were lacking the usage rate was prognosticized to be low. At this point in time, Televerket started to work hard to develop services. Bank services were to be added, and cinema and theatre tickets were to be available. To search for telephone numbers for 25 cents per minute, or get a weather report for 50 cents per minute was not attractive enough, especially when the weather report could be accessed for free over Text-TV. To know about disposable amount and coming payments on the bank account cost 30 cents per minute, a service that was free when the customer called the bank's toll free number. Yet the largest problem, according to Televerkets representative, was that people were not used to the technology. To him, too few were willing to do their bank errands on a small, strange terminal. The challenge is to make people get used to the technology, but, as he put it "by then Teleguide may well have disappeared from the market".
In October 1992, it came to the general public's knowledge that Televerket leaves the Teleguide project, and that they were willing to sell their stake in the company. The costs began to be too high, and Televerket had now begun to look into alternatives, most of them connected to their new revenue-generator -so called 071-numbers. These were numbers that service providers could use and charge high rates. At this time, there were 50 000 terminals and 20 000 plug-ins in stock. No profit was to be seen within a graspable future. Teleguide's managing director was convinced that the project would prolong, and that it at this time was absolutely crucial to have a single, stable, long-term owner. The Swedish Post, Posten, which at the time had begun investing heavily in electronic communication channels was seen as a possible new owner. Posten was already a service provider in Teleguide and was the only provider that did not use a timebased charge when subscribers used Posten's bank services. Posten stated that they had faith in the Teleguide project, and that it was necessary to be patient in order for more service providers to join and thereby develop a sustainable communication system. Shortly after, Esselte declared that they were leaving the project as well. They had invested 12 million USD in Teleguide but told one of the Swedish business dailies that the decision to leave Teleguide had nothing to do with profits or losses, but rather that the project no longer fitted with the rest of their operations. The managing director of Esselte even stated that their involvement in the project was "completely off track" since it had nothing to do with Esselte's core competence, a concept that at time was the buzz-word par excellence at management seminars in Europe. IBM was now the only partner left.
Right before Christmas 1992 IBM, Televerket and Esselte negotiated, and on December 31st it could be read in the papers that "Posten buys Teleguide". In total, the three owners had invested some 30 million USD, and analysts considered Posten to be able to buy in at a very much lower price. Teleguide fitted in Posten's new electronic direction: bank services could be provided, and Posten could take care of the subsequent need for parcel delivery.
But only three weeks later Posten declared that they said no to the deal. "We saw no development potential…Teleguide is technically a good system, but considering our new focus on electronic business to business mail, the system was not right". Posten stated that price was an issue where no agreement was found, but it was a strategic decision not Teleguide's managing director was disappointed that the project was not given the time it needed to develop. He stated that ventures like Teleguide demanded at least five years in order to provide profitability, and that the patience in Sweden apparently was much shorter than in France. The CEO proclaimed that there was a lack of courage and pride in Sweden. The country was simply not yet mature for on-line services, and the owners did not accept the learning period that was needed. The CEO was disappointed with Posten's behaviour in the project's final phase. The contract was ready to be signed, but there was too much internal antagonism in Posten in order for the deal to be closed. The deal stretched out too much in time and Teleguide lost so much time and a discontinuation was the inevitable outcome. Minitel was once again used as reference.
Minitel had been given eight years in order to break even. France was a much more technologically sophisticated, visionary and long-term oriented country. The biggest mistake was according to the managing director of Content (supplier of terminals to Teleguide) that the venture was far too modest. The service costs were too high which resulted in too few subscribers. If the demand was missing the system did not attract service providers. If more money had been invested, the viscous circle could have been avoided, and the project would have been a success. Just like in France.
Posten's representative Bengt Norin was a critique to the entire Teleguide project, and his voice was said to have played an important role for the outcome of the project. He found the Swedish market to be immature and considered it "ridiculous" to believe that people were willing to pay for services that could already be accessed for free through other channels. There was no possibility for Esselte to get their investment back, and according to Norin, an adjusted price could have made the outcome different. The critique against Posten arose quickly however. The journalist Rolf van den Briink wrote that Posten deliberately had delayed the deal in order to win competitive advantages in the construction of their own electronic services. Posten was at the time involved in building what they called "the electronic post office" which was a service that could be accessed through the cable-TV network.
In the end, Teleguide had lost it all
During March 1993, the image of Teleguide being a fiasco was confirmed. The explanations to the outcome were shifting and came from a large number of sources.
Among the explanations were: services too few, services too expensive, the entire project was unnecessary, the interphase was too complicated and boring, the terminals were too bulky, etc. The 22 000 terminals that were out in the Swedish households were in practice useless except if they were used as ordinary telephones. In addition, another 28 000 were in stock, worth 20 million USD and considered to be completely useless. 
Only the sky is the limit. Broadband in Sweden
The use of the Internet has exploded during the last years. Reasons for this can be found in the rising processing capacity of personal computers and the increasing availability of fast communication access to the Internet. Fast access to the Internet is crucial for new Internet-based services to be developed and demanded, especially for new media companies to supply the broader public with content for radio, TV and video transmitted through the Internet. The term "broadband" has become synonym with a very fast electronic highway on which Internet-based products of "the new economy" can travel.
Although there exist alternative technologies for broadband, fibre optics seem to be the widest used infrasystem technology of today.
Recent mergers and contracts of co-operations can illustrate how strategic the global availability of optical fibre enabling broadband is. The new media company AOL recently bought the traditional media company Time Warner, partly because they own a large amount of cables for media distribution. Also, the leading Swedish telecommunication company Telia, soon to be traded on the stock market, has during early spring gained access to 31 600 km optical fibres in North America through co-operation agreements with Worldwide Fibre and Williams Communications.
Other examples in Sweden include newly found companies such as Utfors (Fishman, 1987; Castells, 1989; Castells and Hall, 1994) .
But this is not when the network technology of fibre optics started its establishment in Stockholm. The media attention is rather a result of a lot of work of establishing technology standards, finding financial resources and spokespersons, thus maintaining an increasing and stabilizing support for the fibre optical net. We will now learn more of how the broadband net in Sweden gained in reality.
Tearing down the Swedish telecom monopoly in early 1990s
Deregulation of formerly monopolized markets was suggested to be the most important factor for the development of infrasystems of the information communication of tomorrow (Brooks, 1988:249) . In the early 1990s a conservative government enabling deregulation of several markets ran Sweden. In 1993, the Swedish parliament passed a new telecom act (Reg. Prop.1992 Prop. /93:200, 1992 . This was an important step towards increased competition in the markets of telecommunication and computer (Helgesson, 1998; Helgesson, 1999) .
Telecommunications in Sweden has therefore a long tradition of state owned management, and as such, state responsibility for the construction of a country-wide network for telecommunication. When it had become widely accepted that the infrastructure for telecommunication also could be used for transmitting data, this infrastructure became increasingly important for regional politics in Sweden. However, the state seemed rather reluctant to take an overall responsibility to secure the infrastructure in the country (KA 1990, No. 29) .
Early start for laying fibre optics
Early 1990, the Telephone Agency was involved in a small-scale project testing fibre optics for tele-and datacommunication. Fibre optics was used on a small scale in rural Hemavan-Tärnaby in the northern parts of Sweden, with only 600 inhabitants but wellknown for Swedes since the skiing king Ingemar Stenmark was born there. The aim of the project was to show that modern infrastructure for tele-and datacommunication leads to better service and lowered costs for operating such services (KA 1991, No. 5) . (Please also see www.americasnetwork.com/issues/98issues/981001_edge.html and www.swedtel.telia.se/Ireland/stokab.htm.)
"As a result of early liberal legislation, the City of Stockholm started to install an extensive fibreoptic network via Stokab in order to stimulate multiple investments and innovative new telecommunications and IT services in the Stockholm region. Since Stokab offers the market the fibre-optic infrastructure only -dark fibre -and leaves provision of services and the development of new services to the market, Stokab provides a level playing field for all market players." (http://www.stokab.se/english/about/formation.html)
Despite an increased construction of new fibre optics in the streets of Stockholm not many organizations actually used the fibre-optic infrastructure at the beginning. The basic use of the city net was to decrease the telecom costs and to enable an increased rationalization of the city management. Stockholm had a critical mass of city administrations and local companies to make the heavy investments in fibre optics possible, but most other cities had to rely on Telia in the mid-1990ies. Helsingborg was the first city that bought an ATM-based infrastructure from Telia and cities like Göteborg, Malmö, Halmstad, Lund, Borås and Ronneby were soon to follow in 1995 (KA 1995, No. 2) .
Today, cables filled with dark fibre have been rolled out throughout Stockholm and its surrounding cities. With or without light enlightening those dark fibres, the IT net remains a net covered by streets and buildings. On a normal day in Stockholm, you cannot grasp the net, nor can you see it. But it's there, and at rare occasions you can see construction going on when fibre is rolled out and when streets are up.
Symbolic manifestation for the IT net
Despite these rare occasions of material manifestation, the IT net is also represented in symbolic ways. In their presidential campaign of 1992, Bill Clinton and Al Gore emphasized how important it is to construct a national information infrastructure enabling a strategy for enhanced economic growth: "In the new economy, infrastructure means information as well as transportation. More than half the US workforce is employed in information-intense industries, yet we have no national strategy to create a national information network. Just as the interstate highway system in the 1950s spurred two decades of economic growth, we need a door-to-door fibre optics system by the year 2015 to link every home, every lab, every classroom, every business in America." (Bill Clinton campaign speech on "The Economy", held at Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, on 16 April, 1992 (Leer, 1996:24).) Once the Clinton administration had won the election they initiated The National Information Infrastructure. Agenda for Action, which in September 1993 stated the goal of the national information infrastructure (NII):
"A major goal of the NII is to give our citizens access to a broad range of information and information services. Using innovative telecommunications and information technologies, the NIIthrough a partnership of business, labour, academia, consumers, and all levels of government-will help the United States achieve a broad range of economic and social goals."(Larry Irving, the head of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (US Department of Commerce) mentioned this goal at a speech (Constructing the National Information Infrastructure. Ensuring that All Americans Get Connected) at the Vermont Telecommunications Forum, Winooski Park, Vermont, 20 March 1995 (Leer, 1996:24) .)
At both occasions in 1992 and 1993, the factual construction of the national information infrastructure was preceded by the symbolic and visionary statements of the political leaders of the USA. The IT net was put on the political agenda, not only in the USA but also around the world. In Sweden, in 1994, the prime minister Carl Bildt also took a few symbolic steps to emphasis the importance of IT issues and demonstrating the use of the Internet. On February 4, 1994, Bildt sent an e-mail to president Clinton, which interestingly enough seems to have been the first e-mail between country leaders (Ilshammar and Larsmo, 1997:31f) . Merely three days later, at a speech at the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences (IVA). Bildt announced the launch of a governmental IT commission to explore the potentials of information technology. Many reports were to be written since then and thereby giving information technology a political voice in the ideological debate of technological use for creating welfare.
Thus, support for the IT net has increasingly come from the public sector, and not only from the political leaders. The convergence of telecom and datacom into information technology in the middle of the 1990 coined the new acronym of "IT" pushing out the acronym "ADP" for automatic data processing into the cold. The first time "information technology" was used in the municipal weekly in Sweden, KommunAktuellt, was in an ad of a computer consultant in 1992 (KA 1992, No. 11) . And the first their journalists were comfortable enough to use the acronym "IT" was in 1994. This was after Bildt had announced his efforts to create governmental knowledge around information technology by introducing the IT commission (http://www.itkommissionen.se), when an article appeared with the title: "Stockholm wants to be the IT centre" (KA 1994, No. 14) .
Broadband becomes real
Today we have long heard of the acronyms of TIME (Telecommunication, Information technology, Multimedia and Entertainment), TIMES (Telecommunication, Information technology, Multimedia, Entertainment and Security) and TMT (Telecommunication, Media, and Technology) . And the rather technological description of an information infrastructure for telecommunication (IT net) got paced when the analogy to electronic highways was formulated. Although starting from small numbers, more and more people got to know the Internet and how slow it at times could be. Thereby, electronic highway was an easy way to create an understanding among ordinary people not familiar with information technology on a professional basis. But the real catch to the subject was created when focus increasingly came on the bottleneck of the Internet; slow transmission of larger data chunks such as pictures when homepages were loaded. A word was borrowed from radio transmission, bandwidth, and insiders started talking about the necessity of broadband transmissions. In KommunAktuellt "broadband" was first used in 1997 when the net company of Telia, Telia PubliCom, had an ad before a major conference regarding the renewal of the public sector (KA 1997, No. 31 At about the same time, the Swedish government also presented a governmental report named "Broadband for growth all over the country. Economical, regional and welfare perspectives of the IT infrastructure" which was followed up by the recent governmental bill of March 2000 "An information society for everybody" (Reg. Prop.1992 Prop. /93:200, 1992 Reg.Prop.1999 /2000 :86, 2000 . Broadband plays a central role in these reports and the government suggests to put aside about 100 million dollars for constructing a country wide broadband net. Prop.1999 Prop. /2000 Prop. :86, 2000 . It is probable the private purchases of PCs that has rocketed the Internet use and competence of computers making Sweden the number one IT country, surpassing even the USA, according to IDC. Thereby, Sweden in the lead is in a cluster of advanced countries since Finland, Norway and Denmark close in after USA.
Discussion
Organizations in general, and organizational change in particular are stabilizing effects of organizing processes and not something that exists a priori. In a network of actions there are endless attempts of organizing reality, over and over again. Organizations and institutions change when technologies and network of actions lose or gain in degrees of realities (Latour, 1996) . When actions are repeated and lead to an identifiable path of actions, these paths get an aim and fulfil certain functions and get a normative, intentional tenor. Eventually, when we take action paths for granted and several action paths are linked together, temporary creations appear that we can call network of actions, i.e. action nets. Even if focus is on collective attempts to stabilize or destabilize networks of actions and events, rather than on people and technologies, we do not say that processes exist without structures. We are more inclined to think that they create each other, exist simultaneously and are loosely coupled to each other where the link easily can cease to exist and randomly can find new harbours of couplings (Weick, 1979; Weick, 1995) .
When entities are loosely coupled, and their links easily dispersed, change is thus the norm, and socio-technical networks are in constant struggle to reach temporary stability.
The networks seek to strengthen the links between actors, as this is a way to mobilize other actors in order to reach stability. When a sufficient amount of actors in a network are convinced that a fact, or a machine, or a technology is relevant and existing, it is on a track toward gaining degrees of reality:
"The fate of facts and machines is in later users' hands; their qualities are thus a consequence, not a cause, of collective action." (Latour, 1987:295) To become stable, network technologies seduce politicians to gain strength and become alive and kicking. The network technology also gives the politicians reasons to pick up their voice. Like insecure teenagers, both networks originally had a rather timid and So far in the story, both networks got an increasing number of allies and thus gained in degrees of reality. Intermediaries such as texts, technology, people, and money interacted with each other helped to support the techno-economic network of broadband and Teleguide (Callon, 1991:135) . Both appeared as successes, but one day in May 1992, Teleguide broke up with Minitel. Grounds for the divorce had been a report from Coopers & Lybrand that revealed that the French project was not profitable enough. (Callon, 1991) .
Conclusion
Along with Callon (1991) , it seems fair to say that the game of technology never comes to a stop, and its offshoots are endless. Recruiting and securing allies is a constantly ongoing process. Actors, human as well as non-human, define one another and become interlinked through documents, artefacts, human beings and money (Callon, 1991) . In Apparently, love costs. France used to be in the technological lead with Minitel. But the loving relationship between Minitel and its allies has put France far behind in the rankings of technological maturity. And Sweden, that used to be behind France, quickly fell head over heels in love with the beautiful broadband based Internet. The intimate relationship now ranks Sweden number one in the world when it comes to information technology. But the romantic French are not as heartless. Their affection did not die overnight, and they could not bear leave the one they loved so much.
As we have tried to show with Teleguide and broadband in Sweden, failure and success are no unequivocal concepts. Ideas that do not reach technical, commercial and market success are categorized as failures. But in another time, at another place, the traces they leave may be altered, translated by other actors, to better fit in the dominating Zeitgeist.
Then an idea or a technology that was earlier considered to be unfeasible may suddenly reach a position in the Innovations´ Hall of Fame. Traces of ideas remain in the collective conscience. Fragments of ideas are collected and assembled into new ideas or technologies that may, or may not, blow out in the world materialized in products or images. Sometimes the big plans, the target group thinking and rational actions succeed.
But more often, they fail. By awakening dead theories and technological projects, technosocial change can be studied. In the projects that fail against all odds, or succeed against all odds, knowledge about contemporary social life is embedded.
